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Abstract
Recently, deep learning as a service (DLaaS) has
emerged as a promising way to facilitate the em-
ployment of deep neural networks (DNNs) for var-
ious purposes. However, using DLaaS also causes
potential privacy leakage from both clients and
cloud servers. This privacy issue has fueled the re-
search interests on the privacy-preserving inference
of DNN models in the cloud service. In this paper,
we present a practical solution named BAYHENN
for secure DNN inference. It can protect both the
client’s privacy and server’s privacy at the same
time. The key strategy of our solution is to combine
homomorphic encryption and Bayesian neural net-
works. Specifically, we use homomorphic encryp-
tion to protect a client’s raw data and use Bayesian
neural networks to protect the DNN weights in a
cloud server. To verify the effectiveness of our so-
lution, we conduct experiments on MNIST and a
real-life clinical dataset. Our solution achieves con-
sistent latency decreases on both tasks. In partic-
ular, our method can outperform the best existing
method (GAZELLE) by about 5×, in terms of end-
to-end latency.
1 Introduction
In the past years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved
remarkable progress in various fields, such as computer vi-
sion [He et al., 2016; Ren et al., 2017], natural language pro-
cessing [Vaswani et al., 2017; Devlin et al., 2018], and med-
ical image analysis [Litjens et al., 2017; Havaei et al., 2017].
Recently, deep learning as a service (DLaaS) has emerged as
a promising to further enable the widespread use of DNNs
in industry/daily-life. Google1, Amazon2, and IBM [Bhat-
tacharjee et al., 2017] have all launched DLaaS platforms in
their cloud services. Using DLaaS, a client sends its private
data to the cloud server. Then, the server is responsible for
performing the DNN inference and sends the prediction re-
sults back to the client. Obviously, if the private client data
∗Equal contribution.
1https://cloud.google.com/inference/
2https://docs.aws.amazon.com/machine-learning/index.html
are not protected, using DLaaS will cause potential privacy
issues. A curious server may collect sensitive information
contained in the private data (i.e. client’s privacy).
To address this privacy issue, researchers have employed
the homomorphic encryption to perform various DNN oper-
ators on encrypted client data [Phong et al., 2018; Ma et al.,
2019]. As a result, the cloud server only serves as a compu-
tation platform but cannot access the raw data from clients.
However, there exist two major obstacles in applying these
approaches. First, some common non-linear activation func-
tions, such as ReLU and Sigmoid, are not cryptographically
computable. Second, the inference processing efficiency is
seriously degraded by thousands of times.
To tackle these problems, a recent work [Zhang et al.,
2018] proposes using an interactive paradigm. A DNN in-
ference is partitioned into linear and non-linear computa-
tion parts. Then, only the linear computations are per-
formed on the cloud server with encrypted data. The non-
linear computations are performed by the client with raw
data. However, in such an interactive paradigm, the inter-
mediate features extracted by the linear computations are di-
rectly exposed (sent back) to the client. Thus, a curious
client can leverage these features to reconstruct the weights
of the DNN model held by the cloud [Trame`r et al., 2016;
Zhang et al., 2018]. This issue is called the leakage of
server’s privacy.
In fact, a practical solution for secure DNN inference
should protect both client’s privacy and server’s privacy. In
addition, it should support DNNs with all types of non-linear
activation functions. Unfortunately, there still lacks an effec-
tive approach in literature. The limitations of recent works
are discussed in Section 2.3. Thus, we propose a new method
for secure DNN inference, called BAYHENN. Our key strat-
egy is to combine Bayesian deep learning and homomorphic
encryption. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first ap-
proach that can protect both client’s privacy and server’s pri-
vacy and support all types of non-linear activation functions
at the same time.
BAYHENN follows an interactive paradigm so that all
types of activation functions are supported. On the one hand,
it uses the homomorphic encryption to provide protection for
the client’s privacy. On the other hand, it adds proper ran-
domness into DNN weights to prevent the leakage of the
server’s privacy. This idea is motivated by the learning with
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error (LWE) problem, in which solving the noisy linear equa-
tions system has been proven to be NP-hard [Regev, 2009].
However, “adding proper randomness” is a new challenge.
Directly injecting well-designed Gaussian Noise into weights
will cause a drastic performance degradation [Chaudhuri and
Monteleoni, 2008; Zhang et al., 2017]. Therefore, we pro-
pose to use a more intrinsic method, the Bayesian neural net-
work, to model the weight uncertainty of DNNs. Armed with
the weight uncertainty, we can protect the weight information
by sending obscured features to the client.
In summary, the contributions of our paper are as follows:
• We provide a novel insight that using the Bayesian neu-
ral network can prevent leakage of a server’s privacy un-
der an interactive paradigm.
• Based on this insight, we build a practical solution for
secure DNN inference. Our solution is more (about 5×)
efficient than the best existing method, and is capable of
supporting all types of activation functions.
• We validate the proposed solution on a real-life clinical
dataset, which is less explored in previous studies.
2 Preliminary
In this part, we first introduce some basic notations in DNN
inference. Then, the potential privacy leakages in DLaaS and
the goal of this paper are presented. At last, we summarize
the limitations of previous works on secure DNN inference.
2.1 DNN Inference
We start from the process of a DNN inference. For simplicity,
the following discussion is based on a fully connected neural
network. It can be easily switched to the context of a convo-
lutional neural network, as shown in our experiments.
We take the image classification as an example in this part.
It can be extended to other types of tasks as well (e.g. re-
gression). The image classification aims to assign a label
t to the input image x. To this end, a classification model
M : t = f (x;θ) is trained on some pre-collected data. In a
context of deep learning, the f is a highly non-linear function,
which is formed by alternately stacking several linear (e.g.
fully connected layer) and non-linear (e.g. activation func-
tion) operations3.
Formally, for a neural network, we denote W(i) and b(i)
as weights and biases corresponding to the i-th linear layer.
To calculate outputs (i.e. activations) of the i-th non-linear
layer (denoted as a(i)), a linear transformation is firstly per-
formed on the inputs from previous layers following:
z(i) = W(i)a(i−1) + b(i) (1)
Then, the nonlinear activation function is used to obtain out-
put activation results:
a(i) = ϕ(i)(z(i)) (2)
3 Most previous DNNs satisfy this topology. Note that one can
easily integrate two adjacent linear/nonlinear layers into one “logic”
layer. For example, we can combine one batch normalization and
one convolution layer together.
Client’s
Privacy
Server’s
Privacy
Support all
activation func.
CryptoNets Yes Yes —
GELU-Net Yes — Yes
GAZELLE Yes Yes —
Ours Yes Yes Yes
Table 1: Feature comparison among different solutions.
where ϕ(i) denotes the activation function (e.g. ReLU).
In summary, the classification model M can be reformu-
lated into:
M : t = f(x; {(W(i),b(i))}ni=1) (3)
2.2 Privacy Leakage in DLaaS
In a common setting, there are two parties involved in a pro-
cess of DLaaS. Specifically, at the beginning, a client sends
its private data x into a cloud server, which holds the DNN
model M for inference. Then, the server can perform the
DNN inference and send the prediction results back to the
client. Considering that both the client and the server are
semi-honest, privacy leakages may occur on both sides:
• Client’s Privacy Leakage: From the perspective of a
client, its input data x is directly exposed to the cloud
server in a non-private setting. Thus, the server may col-
lect the sensitive information contained in x.
• Server’s Privacy Leakage: A cloud server also holds
the private data, i.e. the weight parameters and the DNN
structure of M. A curious client may attempt to obtain
these valuable model information.
In this paper, we focus on a secure DNN inference. Our goal
is to prevent the privacy leakage of the input data (client-side)
and the model parameters (server-side). The protection of a
model structure is out of the scope of this paper, yet part of
the DNN model structure (such as the filter and stride size
in the convolution layers and the type of each layer) is also
protected in our solution4.
2.3 Limitation of Previous Work
In this subsection, we discuss the limitations of previous
works, which are most related to ours (listed in Table 1). We
do not consider [Bourse et al., 2018; Sanyal et al., 2018],
since they only work on binary neural networks and do not
outperform the state-of-the-art.
CryptoNets [Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016] is the first sys-
tem for homomorphic encryption based neural network in-
ference. However, its end-to-end latency for a single input
is extremely high, especially on a DNN. More importantly,
CryptoNets cannot support most of the common activation
functions, such as Sigmoid and ReLU, or the common pool-
ing functions, such as Max-Pooling. These two issues limit
the use of CryptoNets in real-life scenarios.
4Juverka et al. [2018] have explained how homomorphic encryp-
tion can hide this information.
GELU-Net [Zhang et al., 2018] proposes using an inter-
active paradigm to address the issues of CryptoNets. How-
ever, the interactive paradigm may result in server’s private
weight leakage. Thus, GELU-Net needs to limit the number
of queries requested by one specific client.
GAZELLE [Juvekar et al., 2018] is state-of-the-art work
combining garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption.
Garbled circuits can be used to protect the client’s weights
[Liu et al., 2017; Mohassel and Zhang, 2017; Rouhani
et al., 2018]. However, such a method introduces non-
negligible computation/communication costs, and does not
support those activation functions which are garbled-circuit
unfriendly (e.g. Sigmoid).
Compared with these works, our proposed solution can
overcome all the above limitations. Moreover, unlike these
works, we validate our solution on a real-life clinical dataset,
which further shows the practicability of our solution in real-
life applications.
3 Our Approach
In this section, we first describe the high-level protocol of
BAYHENN and then detail its implementation for secure
linear/non-linear computations.
3.1 Protocol at a High Level
Here, we elaborate our protocol for secure DNN inference
at a high level. The core idea for designing our protocol is
based on the combination of homomorphic encryption and
deep Bayesian inference.
At a high level, our protocol follows an interactive
paradigm and comprises of two sub-protocols, namely, the
SLC (Secure Linear Computation) and the SNC (Secure
Non-linear Computation) protocols. Consider a basic setting
where the centric server holds the model M and the client
holds the private data x. The inference task t = f(x;θ) is
decomposed into linear and non-linear computations based
on Equation (1) and (2). Each of them is performed by differ-
ent parties (the server and the client) using the SLC and SNC
protocols, respectively. To be specific, the client firstly en-
crypts their private data x and sends the encrypted data to the
server as model input. Then, the server can perform the lin-
ear computations on the encrypted input following the SLC
protocol. Due to most commonly used non-linear activation
functions are not cryptographically computable, the output is
sent back to the client for the further non-linear computation
following the SNC protocol. Then, the client can re-encrypt
the computed results and send them to the server for computa-
tion of the next layer. Once all computation tasks are finished,
the client can receive the final prediction t. The whole pro-
cedure of our protocol is depicted in Algorithm 1. Two core
sub-protocols, SLC and SNC, are detailed in the following
part.
3.2 SLC Protocol
The aim of this protocol is to enable the linear computa-
tions (e.g. convolution) while providing the protection for
both the client’s data and the server’s parameters. In the
following parts, we first introduce some basic functions in
Algorithm 1 Secure DNN inference
Input: (x; S, P (θ|D), {ϕ(i)}ni=1)
Output: (t; ∅)
1: Initiation
2: Server:
3: for k ← 1 to S do
4: samples θk = {W(i)k ,b(i)k }ni=1 from P (θ|D)
5: end for
6: Server: Θ← {θk}Sk=1
7: Client: a(0) ← x
8: for i← 1 to n do
9: z˜(i) ← SLC(a(i−1); Θ)
10: a(i) ← SNC(z˜(i); ϕ(i))
11: end for
12: Client: p← 1S
∑S
i=1 a
(n)
k
13: Client: t← argmaxk pk
a vectorizable homomorphic encryption scheme. Then, we
demonstrate how SLC protocol can successfully achieve the
server-level (server’s parameters) and client-level (client’s
data) privacy protection.
Vectorizable Homomorphic Encryption
To ensure the correctness of the linear operations in cipher-
text, we adopt homomorphic encryption, which provides
three basic functions: the encryption function E, the decryp-
tion function D and the evaluation function Eval. To be spe-
cific, E is responsible for encrypting the plaintext x to the
ciphertext x˜ under a public key. In contrast, D is to decrypt
the ciphertext into the plaintext under a secret key. The ho-
momorphic operations are instantiated by the evaluation func-
tion. For two elements x1, x2 ∈ R (R denotes the plaintext
space as a ring), we can establish the following equations:
D(Eval(E(x1),E(x2),+)) = x1 + x2 (4)
D(Eval(E(x1), x2,×)) = x1 × x2 (5)
where + and × denote the normal addition and multiplica-
tion in the plaintext spaceR, respectively. For simplicity, we
will use the notation x˜1 ⊕ x˜2 and x˜1 ⊗ x2 in the following
part to represent the instantiation of the ciphertext-ciphertext
addition Eval(E(x1),E(x2),+) and the ciphertext-plaintext
multiplication Eval(E(x1), x2,×) respectively. Note that the
ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication is not needed in our ap-
proach.
It is impractical and inefficient to directly apply a conven-
tional homomorphic encryption scheme to the DNN infer-
ence. Firstly, the above functions are defined over the ring R
whereas the parameters in a DNN model are typically float-
ing points. Then, operations (e.g. convolution) in a DNN
model are always performed on the high-dimensional ten-
sors, which leads to the inefficiency of the straightforward
solution (i.e. to compute the tensor multiplication/addition
element by element). To tackle these two issues, we adopt
a vectorizable homomorphic encryption scheme5, which in-
volves the Encode function. This function is capable of
5The vectorization is also know as “batching” or “SIMD” in the
literature.
packing a group of floating points to a single element in
R (i.e. one plaintext). On the contrary, the Decode function
is to transform the plaintext into a number of floating points.
Specifically, we implement the encoding and decoding func-
tions following prior works [Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016;
Juvekar et al., 2018].
Client-side Privacy Protection
To protect the privacy of the client’s data, we make use of
homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryption enables
the client to encrypt the private data and the server to con-
duct the linear computation on the encrypted data. Here, we
use notations in Section 2 to explain how a vectorizable ho-
momorphic encryption scheme works in DNN inference. To
compute the output of the i-th linear layer (z(i)), the client
first encrypt the i-th input vector a(i−1) into a˜(i−1) via the
encoding and encryption functions. For the linear computa-
tion, we can always decompose it into a number of multiply-
accumulate operations of vectors. Thus we can use the Equa-
tion 4 and 5 and the above vectorization technique to achieve
the computation of the linear layer. For simplicity, we formu-
late the process of the linear computation as6:
z˜(i) = Encode(W(i))⊗ a˜(i−1) ⊕ E(Encode(b(i))) (6)
With a little abuse of notations, we use⊗ to represent the mul-
tiplication between an unencrypted matrix and an ecrypted
vector. Armed with the above equations, the server can
achieve linear computation without knowing any information
about the client’s data.
Server-side Privacy Protection
As discussed in Section 2.2, the interactive paradigm comes
with the risk of the weight leakage. To tackle this issue, mo-
tivated by the learning with error (LWE) problem [Regev,
2009], we propose using Bayesian neural networks to build
the model parameters with moderate uncertainty.
The BNN is to model the weight as the probability distri-
butions instead of the fixed floating points in the traditional
DNN. Here, we borrow some notations from the DNN infer-
ence. The target of the BNN is to predict the label distribu-
tion P (t|x). Given the training dataset D, we can estimate
the posterior distribution of the weights P (θ|D) via Bayes
by Backprop [Blundell et al., 2015]. Then, the posterior dis-
tribution can be used for label prediction. Specifically, given
a test data x (client’s data in our case), the label distribution
can be obtained following:
P (t|x) = Eθ∼P (θ|D)(P (t|x,θ)) (7)
To compute the expectation defined in Equation 7, we can
sample a number of models based on the posterior distribu-
tion. These models share the same model architecture while
having different parameters sampled from P (θ|D). Then, we
can perform the inferences of these models and average the
outputs for the final prediction. In summary, the whole pro-
cess can be represented as:
P (t|x) ≈ 1
S
S∑
k=1
P (t|x,θk) (8)
6Here, we take FC layer as an example, in practice, it is natural
to extend such a process to the convolution layer.
Algorithm 2 SLC
Input: (a(i); W(i),b(i))
Output: (z(i); ∅)
1: Client: a˜(i) ← E(Encode(a(i)))
2: Client: sends a˜(i) to the server
3: Server: starts S threads
4: for k ← 1 to S do
5: z˜(i)k ← Encode(W(i)k )⊗ a˜(i−1)k ⊕ E(Encode(b(i)k ))
6: end for
7: Server: z˜(i) ← {z(i)k }Sk=1
8: Server: sends z˜(i) to the client
Algorithm 3 SNC
Input: (z˜(i); ϕ(i))
Output: (a(i); ∅)
1: Server: sends ϕ(i) to server
2: Client:
3: for k ← 1 to S do
4: z(i)k ← Decode(D(z˜(i)k ))
5: a(i)k ← ϕ(i)(z(i)k )
6: end for
7: Client: a(i) ← {a(i)k }Sk=1
where S denotes the number of sampling. θk is the k-th
sampling result and inherits the formulation from Equation
3 in which θk = {W(i)k ,b(i)k }ni=1. The computation of Equa-
tion 8 can be treated as the computation of {P (t|x,θk)}Sk=1,
which is naturally parallelizable. Since the modern server
easily allows process-level parallelism, the computation can
be seen as S parallel processes of DNN inference and do not
significantly increase the computation time.
During the inference of a BNN, due to the features exposed
to the client are inaccurate compared with the normal DNN
inference, it is hard for the client to solve the exact weights
of the server. The hardness comes from the challenge of the
LWE problem, where solving the noisy linear system is as
difficult as solving lattice problems7. Note that the weights
of the BNN are the parameters of massive probability dis-
tributions. In our case, each W(i) follows the multivariate
Gaussian distribution, and the weights of the layer are the
mean and variance vectors of the Gaussian distribution.
Put all things together, we can build the SLC protocol,
which can prevent the leakage of weights and input data si-
multaneously. The SLC protocol is depicted in Algorithm 2.
3.3 SNC Protocol
This protocol is to enable secure non-linear computations of
DNNs. In our protocol, the non-linear computations are per-
formed on the unencrypted data and are executed on the client
individually. Specifically, to compute the output of the i-th
non-linear layer (a(i)), the client first decrypts the input z˜(i)
into z(i) via the decryption function and the decoding func-
7The lattice problems are used as a base to build homomorphic
encryption schemes [Acar et al., 2018].
tion. In the context of Bayesian inference, we will get S vec-
tors of floating points. Then, following Equation 2, the client
can apply the activation function ϕ(i) to each of these vectors
z
(i)
k simultaneously. In summary, the SNC protocol is de-
scribed in Algorithm 3. In the execution process of the SNC
protocol, the client does not need to send any private informa-
tion to the server, and the server does not expose the weight
parameters explicitly/implicitly to the client.
4 Experiment
4.1 Implementation Details
Considering efficiency and comparability, we instantiate our
solution BAYHENN using the SEAL library8, the homomor-
phic encryption library widely used by previous works. For
a fair comparison, we adopt SEAL’s BFV scheme, which is
also used by the state-of-the-art solution GAZELLE. In this
scheme, we set the security level to 128-bit, the degree of the
polynomial modulus to 2048, the plaintext modulus to 20-bit,
and the noise standard deviation to 4.
We deploy BAYHENN and previous works on a centric
server with an Intel Xeon E5-2650 v3 2.30 GHz CPU and
a client PC with an Intel Core i3-7100 3.90 GHz CPU. The
bandwidth between the server and the client is 100 Mbps. To
evaluate efficiency, we use the end-to-end latency (including
protocol setup and communication) as a metric to measure
the performance of different solutions.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
Model Setup
For each DNN architecture used in our experiments, we need
to train three individual versions to meet the requirements of
different secure DNN inference methods. We list these three
versions as follows:
• Normal: Used by GAZELLE and GELU-Net.
• Square: Replacing all the activation functions with the
square function and replacing all the pooling functions
with the sum pooling. Used by CryptoNets.
• Bayes: Bayesian version of the base DNN, which is
trained by Bayes By Backprop. Used by BAYHENN.
Digit Classification
The first task we consider is the hand-written digit classifica-
tion. We build our model based on the MNIST dataset, which
consists of 60,000 training and 10,000 validation images of
28 by 28 pixels. We adopt the LeNet5 [LeCun et al., 1998] as
the basic network architecture with the input size of 28×28.
We select the optimizer following the prior work [Shridhar et
al., 2018]. Specifically, we make use of Adam for Bayes
and Square. The learning rate is set to 0.001. For Normal,
we select the Momentum SGD as the optimizer. The learning
rate and momentum are set to 0.01 and 0.9, respectively. For
a fair comparison, all these versions are trained without data
augmentation or Dropout. The sampling number of Bayes
is set to 4.
8https://github.com/microsoft/SEAL
Framework Version Scheme Accuracy (%) Latency (s)
CryptoNets Square YASHE’ 96.09 3593.22
GELU-Net Normal Paillier 99.05 107.49
GAZELLE Normal BFV 99.05 6.29
Ours Bayes BFV 98.93 1.36
Table 2: Performance comparison on digit classification.
Framework Version Scheme Accuracy (%) Latency (s)
CryptoNets Square YASHE’ 81.66 —
GELU-Net Normal Paillier 83.58 4755.59
GAZELLE Normal BFV 83.58 21.64
Ours Bayes BFV 83.36 4.17
Table 3: Performance comparison on breast cancer classification.
The overall results are shown in Table 2. From the results,
our solution achieves the best latency in contrast to the other
three solutions. For the classification performance, there is a
slight accuracy decrease from Bayes (used by our solution)
to normal. We infer this decrease may be caused by that the
first-order optimizer can not efficiently optimize the Bayesian
neural network. On the other hand, both Bayes and Normal
can outperform Square by a large margin. This can be
caused by the gradient vanish issue in DNN training, which
is brought by the square activation function. In terms of ef-
ficiency, our solution outperforms the state-of-the-art work
(GAZELLE) by 4.93 s in latency (a speedup of 4.63×) with
an accuracy drop of 0.12%.
Classification on Breast Cancer
To further demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we
apply it to a publicly available dataset for invasive ductal car-
cinoma (IDC) classification9, which contains 277,524 patches
of 50×50 pixels (198,738 IDC-negative and 78,786 IDC-
positive). We chose a modified version of AlexNet [Shridhar
et al., 2018] as the base network architecture. For prepro-
cessing, the input image is resized to 32×32. We adopt the
similar training strategy of digit classification, i.e. training
without data augmentation or Dropout.
The overall results10 are shown in Table 3. From the re-
sults, BAYHENN has achieved consistent improvements on
the task of IDC classification. In terms of end-to-end la-
tency, BAYHENN significantly outperforms GAZELLE as
well as other two previous works. In particular, BAYHENN
can outperforms GAZELLE by 17.47 s, which shows a 5.19×
speedup. In contrast to GELU-Net, our method can speed up
for 1140×. This drastic improvement can be attributed to the
use of a more advanced homomorphic encryption scheme.
All the above results indicate that our solution can sig-
nificantly speed up the secure inference of the DNN com-
pared with previous works. Moreover, as discussed previ-
ously, BAYHENN can provide the protection of the server’s
weights without limiting the number of requests by one client.
9 http://www.andrewjanowczyk.com/use-case-6- invasive-
ductal-carcinoma-idc-segmentation/
10The computation of AlexNet using CryptoNets cannot be com-
pleted within an acceptable time.
Version MNIST IDC
Train Test Gap Train Test Gap
Normal 99.79 99.05 0.74 86.63 83.58 3.05
Square 97.87 96.09 1.78 82.67 81.66 1.01
Bayes 98.97 98.93 0.04 84.17 83.36 0.81
Table 4: The gap between training and testing accuracy (%).
Framework LeNet5 on MNIST AlexNet on IDC
CryptoNets 595.50 —
GELU-Net 0.83 2.48
GAZELLE 77.95 252.60
Ours 0.81 6.32
Table 5: The communication costs (MB).
4.3 Discussion
In this section, we provide some discussions from the follow-
ing aspects.
Regularization of BNN
In addition to validating on the testing dataset, we also per-
form the evaluation on the training dataset to explore the reg-
ularization effect of the Bayesian neural network. The results
are shown in Table 4. Here we use the gap between train-
ing and testing accuracy to quantitatively measure the degree
of overfitting. From the results, we observe that the Bayes
version has achieved the smallest gap. For the task of digit
classification, Bayes decreases the gap from 0.74 to 0.04
compared with normal, while there is a gap decrease of 2.24
in the task of IDC classification. We infer the regularization
effect comes from the penalty term (the KL distance between
the prior and variational distribution) in the objective func-
tion (more details can be found in the prior work [Blundell
et al., 2015]). These results indicate that the Bayesian neural
network leads to a stronger regularization effect than the tra-
ditional methods. Moreover, this fact shows our solution can
be used in the scenario where the training data is scarce.
Communication Cost
As shown in Table 5, the communication cost can be a non-
negligible component of the end-to-end latency. Among all
the tested frameworks, GAZELLE is most affected by the
communication cost (more than 90% of the latency comes
from data transmission). We point out that this is mainly due
to the garbled circuits of ReLU and MaxPool, whose size is
proportional to the size of intermediate features of the DNN.
On the contrary, without the use of garbled circuits, BAY-
HENN makes a remarkable decrease in data transmission,
which leads to 4.63× and 5.19× speedup for LeNet5 and
AlexNet respectively. In addition, the communication cost
of GELU-Net is even lower. Indeed, we do need to transfer
multiple intermediate features in ciphertext due to the multi-
ple sampling, but this is a reasonable trade-off between com-
munication costs and privacy protection.
Other Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
For a fair comparison, we make use of the BFV scheme in
our solution. In fact, we have also conducted a series of
experiments to test the performance of other homomorphic
encryption schemes including YASHE’ and CKKS (vectoriz-
able), and Paillier (not vectorizable). Among these schemes
and BFV, there is no single scheme that can outperform oth-
ers for any DNN. Specifically, our solution with the CKKS
scheme has a latency of 1.61 s and 10.07 s (with 1.38 MB
and 7.75 MB communication costs) for LeNet5 and AlexNet
respectively (in addition, YASHE’ and Paillier are much
slower). This result indicates that the BFV scheme is more
efficient for the above benchmarks. However, we also noted
that CKKS will outperform BFV when the shape of interme-
diate features enlarges (e.g. to 64×64). Therefore, the best
scheme should be chosen according to the shape and size of
the features.
Extension on RNN
In the above experiments, we have evaluated the effective-
ness of our solution on CNN based models. However, it is
natural to enable the secure inference of recurrent neural net-
works (RNNs). There have been some prior works that fo-
cus on training a Bayesian RNN. A recent work [Fortunato et
al., 2017] has built a Bayesian RNN with LSTM cells. This
model is used for language modeling task and has achieved
comparable performance compared with a normal RNN. All
basic operations in the Bayesian RNN model are included in
the scope of our solution. Thus we can easily integrate the
model into the protocol in Algorithm 1. In the context of
Bayesian RNN, GAZELLE cannot provide the support for
the RNN model like our solution. This is because the compu-
tation of the Tanh/Sigmoid functions (exist in an LSTM cell)
is particularly expensive under the garbled circuit protocol.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce BAYHENN, a practical solution
for secure DNN inference. The key innovation lies in the
strategy to combine Bayesian deep learning and homomor-
phic encryption. Armed with this strategy, our solution is
capable of achieving secure inference of DNN models with
arbitrary activation functions, while our solution enjoys 5×
speedup in contrast to the best existing work. Applying this
method in the DLaaS scenario is promising and implies a
wide range of real-life applications. This research also points
out a new direction, to apply Bayesian deep learning on the
tasks about privacy protection. For example, previous works
that focus on training a DNN model under differential pri-
vacy, can benefit from the insight in our paper.
Despite the superiority of our method, there is much room
for further improvement. From the view of optimization, how
to design a better algorithm to optimize the Bayesian neural
network is crucial to improving the model accuracy. Another
direction is to use some hardware devices (e.g. FPGAs) to
accelerate the computation of secure DNN inference.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by National Natural Science Foun-
dation of China (No.61572045).
References
[Acar et al., 2018] Abbas Acar, Hidayet Aksu, et al. A sur-
vey on homomorphic encryption schemes: Theory and
implementation. ACM Computing Surveys, 51(4):79:1–
79:35, 2018.
[Bhattacharjee et al., 2017] Bishwaranjan Bhattacharjee,
Scott Boag, et al. IBM deep learning service. IBM Journal
of Research and Development, 61(4):10, 2017.
[Blundell et al., 2015] Charles Blundell, Julien Cornebise,
et al. Weight uncertainty in neural networks. In Pro-
ceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Machine
Learning, volume 37, pages 1613–1622. JMLR.org, 2015.
[Bourse et al., 2018] Florian Bourse, Michele Minelli, et al.
Fast homomorphic evaluation of deep discretized neural
networks. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2018,
volume 10993, pages 483–512. Springer, 2018.
[Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2008] Kamalika Chaudhuri and
Claire Monteleoni. Privacy-preserving logistic regression.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 21,
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 289–296.
Curran Associates, Inc., 2008.
[Devlin et al., 2018] Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, et al.
BERT: Pre-training of deep bidirectional transformers for
language understanding. CoRR, abs/1810.04805, 2018.
[Fortunato et al., 2017] Meire Fortunato, Charles Blundell,
and Oriol Vinyals. Bayesian recurrent neural networks.
CoRR, abs/1704.02798, 2017.
[Gilad-Bachrach et al., 2016] Ran Gilad-Bachrach, Nathan
Dowlin, et al. CryptoNets: Applying neural networks to
encrypted data with high throughput and accuracy. In Pro-
ceedings of the 33nd International Conference on Machine
Learning, volume 48, pages 201–210. JMLR.org, 2016.
[Havaei et al., 2017] Mohammad Havaei, Axel Davy, et al.
Brain tumor segmentation with deep neural networks.
Medical Image Analysis, 35:18–31, 2017.
[He et al., 2016] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, et al. Deep
residual learning for image recognition. In Proceedings of
the 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pat-
tern Recognition, pages 770–778. IEEE Computer Society,
2016.
[Juvekar et al., 2018] Chiraag Juvekar, Vinod Vaikun-
tanathan, and Anantha Chandrakasan. GAZELLE: A low
latency framework for secure neural network inference.
In Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium,
pages 1651–1669. USENIX Association, 2018.
[LeCun et al., 1998] Yann LeCun, Le´on Bottou, et al.
Gradient-based learning applied to document recognition.
Proceedings of the IEEE, 86(11):2278–2324, 1998.
[Litjens et al., 2017] Geert J. S. Litjens, Thijs Kooi, et al. A
survey on deep learning in medical image analysis. Medi-
cal Image Analysis, 42:60–88, 2017.
[Liu et al., 2017] Jian Liu, Mika Juuti, et al. Oblivious neu-
ral network predictions via MiniONN transformations. In
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 619–631.
ACM, 2017.
[Ma et al., 2019] Xu Ma, Xiaofeng Chen, and Xiaoyu
Zhang. Non-interactive privacy-preserving neural network
prediction. Information Sciences, 481:507–519, 2019.
[Mohassel and Zhang, 2017] Payman Mohassel and Yupeng
Zhang. SecureML: A system for scalable privacy-
preserving machine learning. In Proceedings of the 2017
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 19–38.
IEEE Computer Society, 2017.
[Phong et al., 2018] Le Trieu Phong, Yoshinori Aono, et al.
Privacy-preserving deep learning via additively homomor-
phic encryption. IEEE Transactions on Information Foren-
sics and Security, 13(5):1333–1345, 2018.
[Regev, 2009] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with er-
rors, random linear codes, and cryptography. Journal of
the ACM, 56(6):34:1–34:40, 2009.
[Ren et al., 2017] Shaoqing Ren, Kaiming He, et al. Faster
R-CNN: Towards real-time object detection with region
proposal networks. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Anal-
ysis and Machine Intelligence, 39(6):1137–1149, 2017.
[Rouhani et al., 2018] Bita Darvish Rouhani, M. Sadegh Ri-
azi, and Farinaz Koushanfar. Deepsecure: Scalable
provably-secure deep learning. In Proceedings of the 55th
Annual Design Automation Conference, pages 2:1–2:6.
ACM, 2018.
[Sanyal et al., 2018] Amartya Sanyal, Matt J. Kusner, et al.
TAPAS: Tricks to accelerate (encrypted) prediction as a
service. In Proceedings of the 35th International Confer-
ence on Machine Learning, volume 80, pages 4497–4506.
JMLR.org, 2018.
[Shridhar et al., 2018] Kumar Shridhar, Felix Laumann,
et al. Bayesian convolutional neural networks with vari-
ational inference. CoRR, abs/1806.05978, June 2018.
[Trame`r et al., 2016] Florian Trame`r, Fan Zhang, et al. Steal-
ing machine learning models via prediction APIs. In Pro-
ceedings of the 25th USENIX Security Symposium, pages
601–618. USENIX Association, 2016.
[Vaswani et al., 2017] Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, et al.
Attention is all you need. In Advances in Neural Informa-
tion Processing Systems 30: Annual Conference on Neural
Information Processing Systems 2017, pages 6000–6010,
2017.
[Zhang et al., 2017] Jiaqi Zhang, Kai Zheng, et al. Efficient
private ERM for smooth objectives. In Proceedings of the
Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 3922–3928. ijcai.org, 2017.
[Zhang et al., 2018] Qiao Zhang, Cong Wang, et al. GELU-
Net: A globally encrypted, locally unencrypted deep neu-
ral network for privacy-preserved learning. In Proceedings
of the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, pages 3933–3939. ijcai.org, 2018.
